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Full Faith and Credit, More or Less, to Judgments:
Doubts About Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.
STEWART

E. STERK*

Workmen's compensation awards, decrees of administrative tribunals rather than courts, present the question of how far the mandate
of the full faith and credit clause should reach and whether the
clause should bar a claimant from pursuing supplemental compensation in a second state. Recently, in Thomas v. Washington Gas
Light Co., the Supreme Court decided that full faith and credit
should not prevent a claimant from obtaining supplemental compensation. Professor Sterk criticizes the Court's analysis, demonstrating
the Thomas Court's neglect of the federal interests that the clause
should protect. After examining the clause and its policy underpinnings, Professor Sterk concludes that decisions of administrative tribunals should be entitled to the same full faith and credit that
court judgments receive.
An injured employee seeks and recovers a workmen's compensation award
for injuries suffered during the course of his employment. 1 Subsequently,
realizing that he would be treated more generously by the compensation law
of a neighboring jurisdiction in which he has also performed work for his
employer, the employee seeks a supplemental award. The defendant pleads
the earlier award as a bar to further relief in the second state. Since 1943 the
Supreme Court has addressed three times the effect of the full faith and credit
clause2 on the the second state's power to award supplemental compensation. 3
The Court's most recent effort, Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 4 leaves
the issue in a state of considerable uncertainty, largely due to the inability of
more than four justices to agree on any one position. 5 Moreover, and perhaps
more importantly, the opinions of the justices, particularly the plurality
• Associate Professor of Law, Benjamin N. Cardozo School of Law, Yeshiva University. A.B. 1973, J.D.
1976, Columbia University.
I. The typical workmen's compensation act includes the following features: (a) the employee
automatically has a right to certain benefits when he suffers personal injury arising out of and in the course
of employment; (b) negligence and fault are immaterial; (c) arbitrary maximum and minimum dollar
limits; (d) the employee surrenders his common-law rights to sue his employer for the injury; (e)
administration is in the hands of administrative commissions that employ relaxed rules of procedure,
evidence, and conflict-of-laws; and (t) the employer is required to obtain private insurance, state-fund
insurance or self-insurance. I A. LARSON, THE LAW OF WORKMEN'S COMPENSATION § 1.10 (1978).
2. The United States Constitution provides that: "Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to
the public Acts, Records and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general
laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect
thereof." U.S. CONST. art. IV, § I.
3. Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. 261 (1980); Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330
U.S. 622 (1947); Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
4. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
5. Justice Stevens delivered a plurality opinion that Justices Brennan, Stewart, and Blackmun joined.
Id. at 263. Justice White, with whom Chief Justice Burger and Justice Powell joined, concurred in the
judgment. Id. at 256. Justice Rehnquist, joined by Justice Marshall, dissented. Id. at 290.
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opinion of Justice Stevens, raise implications for full faith and credit analysis
that extend far beyond workmen's compensation cases.
Thomas raises two important issues. The first is whether determinations by
workmen's compensation boards and other administrative tribunals should be
accorded the same status as judgments of courts for purposes of the full faith
and credit clause. 6 The second is whether and to what extent the policies or
interests of individual states may control the applicability of the full faith and
credit clause. The three opinions in the Thomas case indicate little agreement
on either issue. 7
This article seeks to resolve both issues. The article begins by explaining the
full faith and credit decisions that set the precedential background of the
Thomas case, as well as the Thomas Court's disposition of those precedents.
After examining the state interests and policy foundations that underlie the
full faith and credit clause, the article then discusses the applicability of those
principles beyond the context of court judgments to the rulings of administrative bodies. Finally, the article reaches two conclusions with respect to the
issues raised in Thomas. First, the article concludes that the policies embodied
in the full faith and credit clause require that administrative adjudications
receive the same full faith and credit as the judgments of a court. Second, the
article argues that only national policies, not interests of individual states,
should serve to limit the scope of the full faith and credit clause as it applies to
judicial proceedings.
I.

THE

Magnolia-Mccartin

DISTINCTION

When the United States Supreme Court considered Thomas, it did so under
constraint of two major precedents: Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt 8 and
6. Full faith and credit has long required that "the judgment of a state court should have the same
credit, validity and effect, in every other court in the United States, which it had in the state where it was
pronounced .... " Hampton v. McConnell, 16 U.S. 234, 235, 3 Wheat. 110, 111 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.),
quoted in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. at 270. This principle is codified in a federal
statute which provides that "Acts, records and judicial proceedings ... [of any state] shall have the same
full faith and credit in every court within the United States .. . as they have by law or usage in the courts of
such State, Territory or Possession from which they are taken." 28 U.S.C. § 1738 (1976).
7. Regarding the first issue, Justice Stevens wrote that there are "critical differences" between a court
judgment and a workmen's compensation award, the former tribunal having general jurisdiction and the
latter having no power to consider the laws of other states. 448 U.S. at 281-82. Justice White, however, saw
no "overriding differences between workmen's compensation awards and court judgments that justify
different treatment for the two." Id. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in
judgment). Justice Rehnquist also "fail[ed] to see" why the first award should not be given "the same full
faith and credit as would be afforded a judgment entered by a court of general jurisdiction." Id. at 294
(Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
Concerning the second issue, Justice Stevens identified the protection of states' interests as constituting
the primary purpose of the full faith and credit clause. Id. at 280. Accordingly, he framed the ultimate
question in Thomas as "whether Virginia's interest in the integrity of its tribunal's determinations
forecloses a second proceeding to obtain a supplemental award in the District of Columbia." Id. Justice
White, on the other hand, recognized two other major purposes of the full faith and credit clause: the
"principle of finality" of judgments, and the provision of a "nationally unifying force." Id. at 288-89
(White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment). Justice Rehnquist rejected the
plurality's attempt to balance state interests, reiterating the Constitution's simple mandate that public acts,
records and judgments be given full faith and credit. Id. at 296 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
8. 320 U.S. 430 (1943).
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Industrial Commission v. McCartin. 9 Because of an apparent inconsistency
between these two cases and because of their significance to Thomas, an
analysis of the Thomas issues must begin with a discussion of both Magnolia
and Mccartin.
A. MAGNOLIA PETROLEUM CO.

11.

HUNT

Hunt, employed in Louisiana to assist in the drilling of oil wells, traveled to
Texas where he suffered an injury from a falling drill stem. 10 He sought and
received a workmen's compensation award in Texas. 11 Pursuant to this Texas
award, the employer's insurer made the required compensation payments. 12
Upon discovering that the Louisiana workmen's compensation law 13 was
more generous to injured workmen than the comparable Texas statute, 14
Hunt sought to recover compensation in Louisiana. 15 In response, the
defendant contended that res judicata principles, given constitutional force
through the full faith and credit clause, barred any award under the Louisiana
statute. 16 Nevertheless, the Louisiana District Court granted Hunt a judgment for the compensation specified in the Louisiana workmen's compensation statute, less a setoff for the amount of the Texas payments.17 The
Louisiana Court of Appeals affirmed, 18 and the Supreme Court of Louisiana
denied review. 19 The United States Supreme Court, in an opinion by Chief
Justice Stone, reversed, holding that the Louisiana judgment had denied full
faith and credit to the earlier Texas workmen's compensation award. 20
Justice Stone began his analysis in Magnolia by noting that under Texas
common law a workmen's compensation award is entitled to the same full
faith and credit as a judgment of a court, and is res judicata as to all matters
actually litigated or "which could have been litigated with respect to the right
to compensation for the injury." 21 Justice Stone noted that consequently,
Texas did not permit its own courts to award a second recovery for a single
injury. 22 Louisiana law, he added, appeared to be similar in not permitting a
second recovery of compensation for a single injury. 23 So much was not in
dispute.
9. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
10. 320 U.S. at 432.
II. Id.
12. Id. at 433.
13. At the time of the action, the applicable Louisiana law was LA. GEN. STAT. tit. 34, ch. 15, §§ 43914409 (current version at LA. REV. STAT. ANN. §§ 23 :1021-1063 (West 1964 & Supp. 1981)).
14. TEX. REV. c,v. STAT. ANN. arts. 8306-8309 (Vernon 1967).
15. 320 U.S. at 433.
16. Id. at 433-34.
17. Id. at 434.
18. 10 So. 2d 109, 115 (La. Ct. App. 1942).
19. 320 U.S. at 434.
20. Id. at 446 (5-4 decision).
21. Id. at 435; accord, Ocean Accident & Goar. Corp. v. Pruitt, 58 S.W.2d 41 , 44-45 (Tex. Comm. App.
1933) (final unappealed decision by Industrial Accident Board entitled to same faith and credit as
judgment of court; decision res judicata as to every point parties might have brought forward).
22. Cf 320 U.S. at 436 (not contended that Louisiana any more than Texas, permits own courts to
award second recovery for second injury). Under Texas law, an employee who has received compensation
in another state may not recover in Texas. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, 132 Tex. 393, 396, 124 S.W.2d 321 ,
322 (1939); TEX. REV. Civ. STAT. ANN. art. 8306, § 19 (Vernon 1967 & Supp. 1980-81).
23. Cf 320 U.S. at 436 (not contended that Louisiana, any more than Texas, permits own courts to
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The Court rejected Hunt's argument that despite the full faith and credit
clause, Louisiana's interest in providing a Louisiana resident with the
measure of recovery allowed by its own laws permitted a supplemental
award. 24 This contention, in the Court's view, ignored the distinction, "long
recognized and applied by this Court, " 25 between according full faith and
credit to judgments and giving the same full faith and credit to local statutory
law. 26
Justice Stone observed that "[t]he full faith and credit clause and the Act of
Congress implementing it have, for most purposes, placed a judgment on a
different footing from a statute of one state, judicial recognition of which is
sought in another." 27 He justified this difference in treatment on the ground
that res judicata principles are not involved when the issue is full faith and
credit to statutes. Each state has constitutional authority to enact its own
laws, 28 and res judicata policies do not provide a basis for choosing between
states' conflicting statutes. 29 Once a claim has been litigated in one state, the
Court concludeq, the full faith and credit clause carries res judicata across
state lines and assures that "a litigation once pursued to judgment shall be as
conclusive of the rights of the parties in every other state as in that where the
judgment was rendered .... "30
Finally, Justice Stone addressed Hunt's contention that the Louisiana suit
rested on a cause of action different from that pursued in Texas. Hunt
asserted that a different cause of action existed because his Texas claim and
remedy were predicated on the Texas statute, whereas the Louisiana claim
rested on the Louisiana statute. As Justice Stone noted, however, each statute
provided the same grounds for recovery.3 1 The Court recognized that Hunt's
theory would allow a plaintiff to bring as many lawsuits as there are states
that would, and constitutionally could, apply their local law to the activity
involved. Moreover, this. result would apply whether the issue involved were
workmen's compensation, or tort, or breach of contract. 32 Therefore, under
award second recovery for single injury).
24. Id.
25. Id.
26. Id. The full faith and credit clause does not require a state to substitute another state's law for its
own. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-501 (1939) (state
where injury occurred may apply own compensation law rather than that of state where employer and
employee contracted for employment); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532, 540-42 (1935) (state of employer and employee may apply own compensation law rather than that of
state where injury occurred).
27. 320 U.S. at 437.
28. Id. at 436.
29. Id.
30. Id. at 439. Nevertheless, in Magnolia the Court conceded the possibility of exceptional cases in
which a state legitimately might ignore a sister-state's judgment and relitigate issues previously resolved.
Id. at 438. The Court simultaneously warned, however, that any limited exceptions were not for the states
to create, but were for the Supreme Court, as the ultimate interpreter of the full faith and credit clause, to
fashion. Id. Thus, a state court may not decline, based on its own perception of a particularly strong state
policy, to enforce a sister-state's judgment. In a state's desire to furnish additional compensation to an
injured workman, the Court perceived no policy sufficiently important to warrant an exception to the
mandate of the full faith and credit clause. Id.
31. Id. at 444.
32. Id. at 445. Justice Stone's opinion pointed out that "it has never been thought that an actionable
personal injury gives rise to as many causes of action as there are states whose laws will permit a suit to
recover for the injury . . . ." Id.
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the Magnolia theory, as long as the grounds for recovery are the same, the
existence of two workmen's compensation statutes that constitutionally could
be applied to the injury should not permit a second recovery for a plaintiff
who has already received an award in a sister state.
Four justices dissented in Magnolia, two of whom wrote opinions. Justice
Douglas argued that the Court should accommodate the interests of Louisiana and Texas by construing the Texas award as a regulation of the
relationship of the parties "only so long as they remained subject to the
jurisdiction of Texas." 33 Under his theory, the Texas proceeding had not
adjudicated Hunt's rights under his Louisiana employment contract, and
should not preclude further litigation upon his return to Louisiana. 34 Justice
Black's dissent was much broader in scope. He emphasized that more than
one state may have an interest in a workmen's compensation award, and was
unwilling to differentiate between the scope of the full faith and credit clause
as applied to statutes and its scope as applied to judgments. 35
The majority opinion in Magnolia expressly left open the effect of the Texas
award in Louisiana if the Texas courts had held that an award of compensation in another state would not bar an award in Texas. 36 The Court's
observation is curious, because the holding in Magnolia itself would require
the Texas courts to bar further recovery once a sister state had rendered a
compensation award. The apparent paradox, however, can be explained. The
treatment in Texas of sister-state awards, in the Supreme Court's view, was
relevant to the intended effect of Texas compensation awards in sister states.37
Therefore, the Court must have reasoned that if Texas courts did not consider
sister-state awards binding in Texas courts, then most likely Texas awards
were not intended to be binding in sister-state courts. Thus deciphered, the
open question was whether an award that the rendering state did not intend to
bar a subsequent sister-state award must nevertheless do so under the
constitutional command of full faith and credit.
B. INDUSTRIAL COMMISSION v. McCARTIN

Four years later, Industrial Commission v. McCartin 38 presented the
question that Magnolia had left open. Kopp, an Illinois bricklayer, contracted
in Illinois to do work in Wisconsin for McCartin, an Illinois employer. 39
Kopp was injured in Wisconsin and filed a claim with that state's industrial
commission. 40 When the defendants objected to the jurisdiction of the
Wisconsin Commission, Kopp filed a claim with the Industrial Commission
of Illinois, seeking resolution of the jurisdictional question. 41 The Wisconsin
33. Id. at 449 (Douglas, J., with Murphy J., dissenting).
34. Id. at 448.
.
35. Id. at 455-56 (Black, J., with Douglas, Murphy & Rutledge, JJ., dissenting).
36. Id. at 430. Under Texas law an employee may not recover in Texas ifhe has received compensation
for the injury in another state. Travelers Ins. Co. v. Cason, 132 Tex. 393, 396, 124 S.W.2d 321, 322 (1939);
TEX. REV. CJV. STAT. ANN. art. 8~06, § 19 (Vernon 1967).
37. The majority opinion in Magnolia relied on the finding of the Louisiana court that the Texas award
had res judicata effect in Texas. Id. at 443. The Court acknowledged that if the original award had not been
res judicata in Texas, full faith and credit would not have barred a subsequent recovery. Id.
38. 330 U.S. 622 (1947).
39. Id. at 623.
40. Id.
41. Id. at 624.
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commission notified the parties that under Wisconsin law, Kopp could claim
compensation under the Illinois act42 and then again in Wisconsin, with a
setoff in Wisconsin for amounts paid under the Illinois statute. 43 Kopp and
Mccartin agreed to a settlement of all claims arising under the Illinois act,
with the express provision that "(t]his settlement does not affect any rights
that applicant may have under the Workmen's Compensation Act of the State
ofWisconsin."44 The Illinois Commissioner approved the settlement contract,
and Kopp received payment in Illinois. 45
Before Kopp could pursue his second claim in Wisconsin, the United States
Supreme Court issued its decision in Magnolia. 46 In response to Magnolia,
McCartin filed an amended answer in which he contended that the full faith
and credit clause barred the Wisconsin proceedings. 47 The commission
nevertheless granted Kopp a supplemental award. After the Wisconsin courts
set aside the award on authority of Magnolia, 48 the United States Supreme
Court granted certiorari49 and reversed unanimously. 50
The Court distinguished Magnolia on the ground that the Illinois award,
unlike the Texas award in Magnolia, was not intended to foreclose Kopp's
rights to recover under other states' workmen's compensaton legislation. 51
Unlike Texas law, Illinois law gave no indication that an award by that state
was "made explicitly in lieu of any other recovery for injury." 52 The Court
concluded that only "unmistakable language" in a state's statute or judgment
would justify a finding that one compensation award was intended to preclude
additional recoveries in other states. 53 In addition, the Court based its
conclusion on the language of the Illinois award, which explicitly reserved
Kopp's rights in Wisconsin. 54 This reservation established that the Illinois
award, consistent with the Court's reading of the Illinois statute, 55 was
42. ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, §§ 138.1-138.27 (Smith-Hurd 1969).
43. 330 U.S. at 624.
44. Id.
45. Id. at 625. The Illinois Commissioner informed Kopp that he did not know what effect the
reservation of rights in Wisconsin would have, but Kopp agreed to "take chances on Wisconsin," id., in
order to benefit from the lump-sum settlement. Id.
46. Id.
47. Id.
48. Mccartin v. Industrial Comm'n, 248 Wis. 570, 22 N.W.2d 522 (1946), rev'd, 330 U.S. 62 (1947).

49. 329 U.S. 696 (1946).
50. 330 U.S. at 630. Justice Rutledge concurred in the result. Id.
51. Id. at 626-27. The Mccartin Court noted the express finding in Magnolia that the Texas workmen's
compensation law precluded a second recovery in any other state. Id. at 626. In fact, however, what the
Magnolia Court actually found was that the Texas law would not allow a recovery in Texas if the employee
had received compensation elsewhere. See note 36 supra and accompanying text (discussing Court's
construction of Texas workmen's compensation law). Nevertheless, by implication the converse also may
be true.
52. 330 U.S. at 626. Illinois law provides that "[n]o common law or statutory right to recover damages .
. . for injury or death sustained by any employee while engaged in the line of his duty as such employee,
other than the compensation herein provided, is available to any employee who is covered by the provisions
of this Act .... " ILL ANN. STAT. ch. 48, § 138.5(a) (Smith Hurd 1969 & Supp. 1980-81). The Court found
"nothing in the statute or in the decisions thereunder to indicate that it is completely exclusive ... ." 330
U.S. at 627.
53. Id. at 628. The Court noted that workmen's compensation laws are liberally construed in
furtherance of the purpose for which they were enacted-the benefit of the employee. Id.
54. 330 U.S. at 628-29.
55 . See note 52 supra (discussing Court's interpretation of Illinois law).
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intended only to bar further claims in Illinois, not a supplemental workmen's
compensation award in Wisconsin. 56 Thus, in the Court's judgment, Magnolia
did not constitute controlling precedent for McCartin.
Thus, until Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 57 there was a tension
between the Supreme Court's precedents on the applicability of full faith and
credit to workmen's compensation awards. Under Magnolia, the second state
must give full faith and credit to a workmen's compensation award of the
rendering state. 58 Mccartin qualified that rule severely by holding that full
faith and credit principles apply only if the law of the rendering state contains
"unmistakable language" indicating the state's intention to bar subsequent
awards.5 9 Because few workmen's compensation statutes contained the
"unmistakable language" required in Mccartin, the Magnolia rule was of
little effect. 60 Yet Magnolia and McCartin continued to coexist.
C. THE DISTINCTION AND ITS DEMISE

The distinction between the two cases rests on the intended extraterritorial
effect of the workmen's compensation award. Because under Texas law the
award_in Magnolia was intended to bar an additional remedy elsewhere, a
second award in Louisiana was impermissible; because under Illinois law the
Illinois award in McCartin was not so intended, the subsequent Wisconsin
award did not violate the full faith and credit clause.
Implicitly, the Mccartin distinction rests on the premise that only one
purpose underlies the full faith and credit clause: the promotion of respect for
sister-state judgments. If this were the sole purpose of the clause, the
distinction would be unassailable, because it gives each state judgment the
effect that the state has intended. The Mccartin premise, however, is
incorrect.
As courts have long recognized, respect for sister-state judgments is not the
only policy that the full faith and credit clause advances, nor is it even the
primary one. Justice Stone emphasized as early as 1943 that the full faith and
credit clause is a "nationally unifying force" 61 that restricts the rights of
otherwise independent sovereignties "by making each an integral part of a
single nation, in which rights judicially established in any part are given
nation-wide application. " 62
56. 330 U.S. at 630.
57. 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
58. See notes 20-30 supra and accompanying text (discussing Magnolia holding).
59. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text (discussing McCartin holding).
60. See Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448 U.S. at 274 & n.21 (because Illinois statute
construed in McCartin typical of most states' laws, Magnolia had little practical effect after McCartin). The
Thomas Court observed that only Nevada's statute appears to contain the unmistakable language required
under Mccartin. Id.
61. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. at 439; see Sherrer v. Sherrer, 334 U.S. 343, 355 (1948)
(purpose of clause to transform aggregation of independent states into nation); Milwaukee County v. M.E.
White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935) (purpose of clause to make several states integral parts of single
nation); Reese & Johnson, The Scope of Full Faith and Credit to Judgments, 49 COLUM. L. REV. 153, 161
(1949) (purpose of clause to create unified nation by altering status of otherwise independent states).
62. 320 U.S. at 439. Dissenting in Magnolia, Justice Douglas agreed that "[t]he command of the full
faith and credit clause frequently makes a reconciliation of the two [states'] interests impossible. One must
give way in the larger interest of the federal union." Id. at 447 (Douglas, J ., with Murphy, J., dissenting).
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Permitting individual states to determine the extraterritorial effect of their
own judgments is inconsistent with this policy of national unification. If, for
example, a state were to enact a statute providing that all the state courts'
judgments in tort actions would have no extraterritorial effect, a plaintiff
could relitigate his tort claim in any sister state that could exercise jurisdiction
over the defendant, thereby thwarting the policy of national unification. 63
Two contrary judgments arising out of the same-set -of facts could stand
within the same nation. The possibility of conflicts would be great, especially
if some states intended their judgments to have extraterritorial effect and
others did not. 64 Such conflicts might be tolerable, for lack of an alternative,
in an association of independent sovereignties. Within our federal system,
however, it was just such difficulties that the full faith and credit clause was
designed to eliminate.
The alternative to permitting states to determine the extraterritorial effect
of their judgments is, of course, a resort to the basic federal policy underlying
the full faith and credit clause: the need to join many individual sovereignties
into a national union. Recognizing that the basic question is a federal one does
not mean, however, that the states have no role in determining the extraterritorial effect of their own judgments. By determining the effect of a judgment
within the state, a state may determine indirectly the extraterritorial effect of
its judgment. 65 This is true because the federal mandate, as expressed in the
statute implementing the full faith and credit clause, 66 requires sister states to
give judgments the same effect that they would have within the rendering
state. 67 Nevertheless, the rendering state should not be permitted to differentiate between the effect its judgments have abroad and their effect at
home, because such differentiation runs counter to the need for unification
embodied in the full faith and credit clause. Consequently, no state should be
permitted to prescribe directly, as a matter of state law, the extraterritorial
effects of its judgments.
It is this criticism of the Magnolia-Mccartin distinction that underlies the
plurality opinion in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. In Thomas, a
District of Columbia employee suffered a back injury while working in
63. Assume, for example, that state X rendered a judgment for the plaintiff in a tort action. Unless the
defendant had assets within that state, the plaintiff's judgment, under the terms of the statute, would be of
no use to him because sister states would give no effect to the judgment. In order to secure redress, the
plaintiff would be required to relitigate the dispute in another state. Conversely, if the defendant prevailed
in state X, that judgment would not protect him from subsequent actions in other states. Clearly, neither
result would be consistent with the needs of the nation as a whole.
64. Suppose, for instance, state X , having declared that its judgments are entitled to no extraterritorial
effect, were to award a judgment to the defendant in a civil action. Subsequently, the plaintiff, after
relitigating the same cause of action in state Y, receives a judgment. If the plaintiff seeks to enforce state Y's
judgment in state X , should he prevail? Full faith and credit would require state X to enforce the Y
judgment, because Y's judgment was not limited in territorial scope. Yet the courts of state X would be
unlikely to ignore the existing X judgment. Moreover, the last-in-time rule ofTreinies v. Sunshine Mining
Co., 308 U.S. 66 (1939) would not resolve the issue because the basis for the Treinies holding, the
opportunity to litigate the validity of the first judgment in the second state, would not exist if all the parties
conceded in the state Y proceeding that the judgment of state X was valid, but irrelevant to the Y
proceedings because of the X statute.
65. The statute implementing the full faith and credit clause requires only that a judgment receive the
same effect outside the state as it would receive within the rendering state. See note 6 supra (quoting
pertinent parts of federal statute).
66. 28 u.s.c. § 1738 (1976).
67. Id.
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Virginia. 68 After receiving a compensation award in Virginia he sought
supplementary compensation in the District of Columbia. 69 The administrative law judge in the District of Columbia granted the supplementary award
despite the defendant's contention that the Virginia award excluded any other
recovery.7° Relying upon the full faith and credit clause, however, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit reversed a Benefits Review
Board order upholding the supplemental award. 7 1
Although Justice Stevens' opinion for the plurality in Thomas conceded
that "Mccartin by its terms rather than the earlier Magnolia decision, is
controlling as between the two precedents," 72 the plurality declined to rest its
decision on that ground. Instead, the plurality acknowledged that the
Mccartin rule "represents an unwarranted delegation to the States of this
Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith and credit
questions," 73 and embarked on a reconsideration of Magnolia and Mccartin.
Faced with conflicting precedents, the Court first examined the constraints
that the doctrine of stare decisis imposed upon the Court's disposition of
Thomas. 14 Recognizing that McCartin "all but overruled Magnolia," 15 the
Court concluded that the doctrine of stare decisis would not be served either
by attempting to revive Magnolia or by attempting to preserve the uneasy
coexistence of the two cases. 76 Freed from the fetters of stare decisis, the
plurality chose to analyze the case by considering the state interests involved.
In the plurality's view, three specific interests were at stake: the interest of
Virginia in limiting the potential liability of employers doing business within
the state's borders, the interest of both Virginia and the District of Columbia
in the welfare of the injured employee, and the interest of Virginia in the
respect accorded its determinations by other sovereigns. 77 The Court evaluated these three interests and concluded that none should preclude a supplemental award in the District of Columbia. 78 Because this conclusion was
68. 448 U.S. at 264.
69. Id. at 265.
10. Id.
71. Washington Gas Light Co. v. Thomas, 598 F.2d 617 (4th Cir. 1979), rev'd, 448 U.S. 261 (1980).
72. 448 U.S. at 269. The applicable Virginia statute provides that " [t]he rights and remedies herein
granted ... shall exclude all other rights and remedies .. . at common law or otherwise .... "VA. CODE §
65.1-40 (1980). Justice Stevens noted that although this provision is not identical to the Illinois statute in
Mccartin, it contains no "unmistakable language" that precluded supplementary compensation. 448 U.S.
at 269. The absence of such language led him to believe that McCartin was the controlling precedent. Id.
73. Id. at 271. Before McCartin, the Supreme Court had established the principle that "[t]his Court
must determine for itself how far the full faith and credit clause compels the qualification or denial of rights
asserted under the laws of one state, that of the forum, by the statute of another state." Pacific Employers
Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493,502 (1939). Inevitably, the McCartin rule conflicted
with this principle. 448 U.S. at 271.
74. Id. at 272.
15. Id. at 271 n.70.
16. Id. at 277. In addition, the Thomas Court recognized that the Magnolia holding was in direct
conflict with the Restatement of Conflict of Laws. See id. (under Restatement, prior workmen's
compensation award no bar to proceeding in another state; amount of first award credited on second)
(citing RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT OF LAWS § 403 (1934)).
77. 448 U.S. 277.
78. Id. at 286. The first interest was not controlling because the employee initially could have sought
compensation in either jurisdiction against the same employer. Id. at 280. The employer and the insurer
"would have had to measure their potential liability exposure by the more generous of the two workmen's
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incompatible with Magnolia but could coexist with Mccartin, the plurality
concluded that Magnolia should be overruled. 79
Concurring in the judgment, three members of the Court advocated
retaining the Magnolia-Mccartin distinction, in deference to principles of
stare decisis. 80 Nevertheless, the concurring opinion of Justice White found
Magnolia to be the "sounder doctrine" and suggested that Mccartin rested
"on questionable foundations." 81 Justice Rehnquist, in dissent, characterized
the Mccartin case as "analytically indefensible" and advocated a return to the
Magnolia rule. 82 In light of this split in the Court, the current status of the
Magnolia-Mccartin distinction is somewhat uncertain, although it undoubtedly has been discredited analytically.
Despite the range of views expressed in the various Thomas opinions, what
is more important for present purposes is the analysis in the plurality opinion.
In deciding that the Virginia workmen's compensation award did not bar a
subsequent District of Columbia award, the plurality evaluated the state
interests "affected by the potential conflict between Virginia and the District
of Columbia." 83 Because a supplementary award in the District of Columbia
would not adversely affect Virginia's interests, the plurality held that full faith
and credit did not bar the second award. 84 In addition, the plurality
questioned the Magnolia Court's conclusion that full faith and credit rules
applicable to judgments generally are equally applicable to workmen's
compensation awards. 85 It is these two features of the plurality opinion-the
emphasis on state interests in determining the application of the full faith and
credit clause and the questioned applicability of full faith and credit principles
to workmen's compensation awards-that provide the focus of the remainder
of this article.
II.

THE FULL FAITH AND CREDIT CLAUSE:
THE ROLE OF STATE INTERESTS

The Supreme Court has said repeatedly that the full faith and credit clause
is an instrument of national unification, designed to help create a nation out of
what were once independent sovereign states. 86 Any unification process
compensation scheme in any event." Id. The second interest, that of the injured workman, clearly did not
foreclose successive awards and constituted an interest common to both jurisdictions. Id. Virginia's interest
in the integrity of its decisions did not require the denial of a second award for two reasons. First, the
District of Columbia proceeding did not involve the relitigation of Virginia's factual determinations. Id. at
281 ; see note 158 infra and accompanying text (discussing Thomas Court's conclusion that only factual
findings entitled to res judicata effect). Second, the jurisdictional limitations on an administrative tribunal
empower it to establish rights only under the laws of its own state. 448 U.S. at 282.
79. Id. at 286. A total of five other justices concluded that Magnolia should not be overruled. See id. at
289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring); id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J.,
dissenting).
80. 448 U.S. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell. J., concurring in judgment).
81. Id.
82. Id. at 290 (Rehnquist, J., with Marshall, J., dissenting).
83. Id. at 277.
84. Id. at 286.
85. Id.
86. E.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,439 (1943); Williams v. North Carolina, 317
U.S. 287, 294 (1942); Milwaukee County v. M.E. White Co., 296 U.S. 268, 276-77 (1935).
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requires some sacrifice by the individual components to satisfy the requirements of the union; so it is with the full faith and credit clause. The command
of the clause necessitates the occasional subordination of one state's interests
to those of the union. The difficulty lies in determining when the circumstances require sacrifice by the individual states in favor of the common goal,
and when they do not.
A. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO STATUTES

Until Thomas, the Supreme Court had embarked on a line of full faith and
credit analysis that drew a sharp distinction between the role of state interests
depending on whether judgments or statutes were involved. 87 A broad reading
of the Thomas case, however, suggests a blurring of that distinction, a
blurring that is unwarranted in light of the policies that underlie full faith and
credit.
The Constitution itself makes no distinction between the full faith and
credit to be given to "public Acts" and that to be accorded "judicial
Proceedings. 88 The statute implementing the.constitutional provision, 89 however, did draw a distinction. 90 Judicial proceedings, according to the statute,
were entitled to "such faith and credit given them in every court within the
United States, as they have by law or usage in the courts of the state from
whence the said records are or shall be taken." 91 No parallel provision defined
the scope of full faith and credit to statutes. During the 1948 recodification
Congress, apparently without any intention to work a change in the law,
amended the statute to place judicial proceedings and public acts on the
same footing. 92 Whatever the literal language of the Constitution and the
statute, the question remains whether any interests of the forum state may be
sufficiently strong to justify that state's refusal to give effect to a sister state's
statutes that would be, and constitutionally could be, given effect in the sister
state.
87. See, e.g., Williams v. North Carolina, 317 U.S. 287,296 (1942) (full faith and credit clause does not
compel courts of one state to subordinate local interests to statutes of other states); Pacific Employers Ins.
Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500 (1939) (full faith and credit clause does not compel
one state to enforce statutes of another); Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S.
532, 550 (I 935) (same).
88. For text of the full faith and credit clause, see note 2 supra.
89. Act of May 26, 1790, I Stat. 122, ch. 11, § 1.
90. The wording of the statute is ambiguous:
§ I. Be it enacted, &c, That the acts of the legislatures of the several states shall be
authenticated by having the seal of their respective states affixed thereto: That the records and
judicial proceedings of the Courts of any state shall be proved or admitted, in any other court
within the United States, by the attestation of the Clerk .... And the said records and judicial
proceedings authenticated as aforesaid, shall have such faith and credit given to them, in
every court within the United States, as they have, by law or usage, in the courts of the states
from whence the said records are, or shall be, taken.

Id.
91. Id.
92. A provision of the amendment incorporated, in passing, public acts as well as judicial proceedings:
"[t]hat all provisions of this act, and the act to which this is a supplement, shall apply as well to the public
acts, records, ... [and]judicial proceedings ... of the respective territories ... as to [those] ... of the several
states." Act of March 27, 1804, I Stat. 298, ch. 61, § 2.

--
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The language of the full faith and credit clause leaves unclear precisely
what it means to give a sister state's statutes the same full faith and credit they
receive in the sister state. The most literal analysis would require that the
forum apply the sister state's statute in any case where, on the same facts, the
sister state would deem the statute applicable. Whatever the theoretical
plausibility of such a rule, however, its practical result would be nonsensical.
Whenever two states had enacted rules by their terms applicable to the same
controversy, each state's courts, by the mandate of full faith and credit, would
be forced to ignore the local law in favor of the contrary law of the sister
state. 93 Not only would such a rule frustrate the interests of each state, but
perhaps more importantly, the rule would do nothing to advance the policy of
national unification that underlies the full faith and credit clause. Such a rule,
of course, has never warranted serious consideration.
Another possible reading of the full faith and credit clause, and one that
would make the clause an instrument of national unification, would construe
the clause to mean that constitutionally only one state's law may govern any
single transaction and that one law must receive full faith and credit in all
other states. In effect, this interpretation would make choice of law a
constitutional discipline governed entirely by the full faith and credit clause.
One set of choice-of-law rules would apply to any controversy arising
anywhere in the United States, no matter where in the United States the
action might be brought. Although the Supreme Court generally has not
adopted this approach, the Court has adopted it in at least one·area. 94
Although constitutionalizing choice-of-law would promote national unification, the Supreme Court appears to have retreated from its earlier
inclination to adopt that approach. 95 At least two reasons support the Court's
retreat from using the full faith and credit clause as an instrument for
nationalizing choice of law. The first is the enormous burden that the Court
would bear in hearing and deciding choice-of-law cases from every jurisdiction, especially in an era of competing choice-of-law theories and disagreement over the judicial function in resolving choice-of-law controversies.96
93. As the Court has explained:
A rigid and ritual enforcement of the full faith and credit clause, without regard to the
statute of the forum, would lead to the absurd result that, wherever the conflict arises, the
statute of each state must be enforced in the courts of the other, but cannot be in its own.
Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
94. Order of United Commercial Travelers v. Wolfe, 331 U.S. 586 (1947), for example, may indicate
that under full faith and credit principles membership rights in fraternal benefit corporations are governed
only by the law of the state of incorporation. See id. at 589 (six-month limitation barring death benefits
claim valid in state of incorporation although such limitation void under law of forum state). Yet the recent
case of Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302 (1981) leaves the authority of Wolfe in a dubious state. See
id. at 319-20 (when decedent and insurer had substantial contacts with Minnesota no full faith and credit
clause violation in Minnesota court's applying Minnesota law to claim on Wisconsin insurance policy for
death in Wisconsin of Wisconsin resident).
95. Compare Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 319-20 (1981) (choice-of-law question resolved
by examining interests of forum state and fairness) with New York Life Ins. Co. v. Dodge, 246 U.S. 357,
376-377 (1918) (under fourteenth amendment valid contract executed in New York concerning insurance
policy executed in Missouri could not be rendered ineffective by Missouri).
96. In Allstate Ins. Co. v Hague, 449 U.S. at 306-07, for example, the Court noted that the forum state
had adopted the analytical framework for resolving choice-of-law questions proposed by Professor Leflar.
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Considerations of federalism suggest the second reason. As the Court has
remarked:
[T]he very nature of the federal union of states, to which are
reserved some of the attributes of sovereignty, precludes resort to
the full faith and credit clause as the means for compelling a state
to substitute the statutes of other states for its own statutes dealing
with a subject matter concerning which it is competent to legislate.97
Thus, the Court has recognized that requiring complete uniformity is neither
desirable nor permissible under the concept of federalism.
Although the Supreme Court has not made choice-of-law a constitutional
discipline, the Court has never suggested that the states are free to fashion
choice-of-law doctrine without reference to constitutional limitations. Recent
cases in which the Court upheld state choice-of-law decisions indicate
unmistakably that some constitutional restrictions on choice of law remain. 98
In this regard, the interests or policies of the several states have assumed
considerable importance. In many cases more than one state has an interest or
policy that would be frustrated by an inability to apply its own rule.
Apparently recognizing that in such cases there is no single "correct" method
for resolving the dispute, the Court has permitted any state with sufficient
interest in or connection with a dispute to apply its own rule. 99 The focus, ..-..
then, has been on whether an individual state has an interest that justifies
application of its own rule despite the existence of a contrary rule applied in
another jurisdiction.
This focus on states' interests, broadly defined, is unavoidable when
considering the application of full faith and credit to public acts. When one
See Leflar, Choice-Influencing Considerations in Conflicts Law, 41 N.Y.U. L. REV. 267,282 (1966) (factors
include predictability, interstate order, simplification of judicial task, advancement of forum's interests,
and applying better rule of Jaw). The Court declined to evaluate this theory and restricted its role to
determining whether the state had acted within its constitutional authority. 449 U .S. at 307. Even if the
Court were to adopt a set of apparently rigid choice-of-Jaw rules, the opportunity for state and lower
federal courts to manipulate individual cases to fit one or another of those rules would likely be great
enough to keep the Court well-stocked with choice-of-law cases.
97. Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 501 (1939).
98. See, e.g., Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U .S. 302, 307 (1981) (Court's sole function to determine
whether state court's choice of its own Jaw exceeded federal constitutional limitations); Nevada v. Hall, 440
U.S. 410, 421 (1979) (full faith and and credit clause requires each state to give effect to official acts of other
states unless in violation ofown public policy); Clay v. Sun Ins. Office, 377 U.S. 179, 181-82 (1964) (State's
ample contacts with transaction sufficient to justify application of its law without violation of full faith and
credit or due process).
99. The Supreme Court has most recently articulated its standard as whether the forum state has "a
significant aggregation of contacts with the parties and the occurrence, creating state interests, such that
application of its law [is] neither arbitrary nor fundamentally unfair." Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S.
302, 320 (1981). Dissenting in Hague, Justice Powell nevertheless articulated a similar approach: "In short,
examination of contacts addresses whether the state has an interest in the application of its policy in this
instance . . . . If it does, the Constitution is satisfied." Id. at 334-35 (Powell, J., with Burger, C .J. &
Rehnquist, J., dissenting) (quoting B. Currie, The Constitution and Choice of Law; Governmental Interest
and Function, in SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CoNFLICT OF LAWS 189 (1963)).
In his concurring opinion in Hague Justice Stevens suggested a somewhat different formulation : "the
[full faith and credit] Clause should not invalidate a state court's choice of forum law unless that choice
threatens the federal interest in national unity by unjustifiably infringing upon the legitimate interests of
another State." Id. at 323 (Stevens, J., concurring).
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state as sovereign asserts an interest in applying its legal rule to a particular
dispute, the full faith and credit clause cannot justify forbidding that state to
do so unless the sovereignty of a sister state is thereby affected. 100 Even if a
sister state has a sovereign interest in a controversy, the only way to resolve
that conflict is to weigh the respective interests of the two states or to leave
each state free to pursue its own policies. 101 No federal policies can provide a
basis for frustrating the sovereign interests of one state rather than those of
another.
Without first declaring choice of law to be a strictly constitutional
discipline, the Court cannot decide questions of full faith and credit to public
acts unless it evaluates the interests, broadly defined, of the states involved. 102
I00. Professor Martin has emphasized that the full faith and credit clause requires respect and
deference to the sovereign interests of other jurisdictions, not to the personal rights of parties. See Martin,
A Reply to Professor Kirgis, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 151, 153 (1976) (advocating full faith and credit
approach rather than fairness approach to conflicts cases because former focuses on interest of states other
than forum); Martin, Constitutional Limitations on Choice of Law, 61 CORNELL L. REV. 185, 192, 196
(1976) (same) [hereinafter Martin, Constitutional Limitations]. See also Kirgis, The Roles of Due Process
and Full Faith in Choice of Law, 62 CORNELL L. REV. 94, 119-120 (1976) (explaining full faith and credit
limitations on choice-of-Jaw determinations). Professor Martin's analysis suggests, of course, that if no
other jurisdiction has a sovereign interest in a particular resolution of a dispute, the forum should be free
from full faith and credit constraints in deciding what rule of Jaw to apply.
In his concurring opinion in Hague, Justice Stevens set out the following formulation of full faith and
credit limitations:
The Full Faith and Credit Clause ... [directs] that a State, when acting as the forum for
litigation having multistate aspects or implications, respect the legitimate interests of other
States and avoid infringement upon their sovereignty. The Clause does not, however, rigidly
require the forum state to apply foreign law whenever another State has a valid interest in the
litigation. On the contrary, in view of the fact that the forum State is also a sovereign in its
own right, in appropriate cases it may attach paramount importance to its own legitimate
interests.
Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 322-23 (Stevens, J., concurring) (citations omitted). Justice Stevens
suggested an additional basis for upsetting a choice-of-Jaw decision: arbitrariness or fundamental
unfairness to a litigant in violation of the due process clause. Id. at 326-31.
IO I. This article makes no attempt to enumerate what connections with a state would suffice to give the
state a sovereign interest in a dispute. The analysis pursued in this article does not depend on any particular
parochial conception of a state interest, such as the one espoused by proponents of the governmental
interest analysis. The Supreme Court might employ various criteria to determine whether a state has an
interest in a particular dispute that is sufficient to justify the application its own Jaw. Once the Court
decides that a state has such an interest it cannot forbid the state to apply its own Jaw unless the Court
chooses to balance the various states' interests, and concludes that application of that state's Jaw would
cause more significant frustration of the interests of other states.
102. If all choice-of-law decisions were a question of constitutional mandate, the Supreme Court could
decide them without reference to state interests. Federal principles, as yet undeveloped, could guide choiceof-law decisions that were independent of any state interests. Under this approach, a state's rule could
govern even if the state were to disclaim any sovereign interest in the controversy. Such a constitutional
choice-of-law system, however, is inconsistent with the prevalent notion that the full faith and credit
clause, as applied to public acts, stands as a protection of state sovereignty. See note 100 supra (discussing
importance of interests of non-forum states).
Even if one views the full faith and credit clause as a protection against arbitrariness and fundamental
unfairness, as the plurality opinion in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. at 320, suggests, an evaluation of
state interests is still necessary. The plurality opinion in Hague implies that if a state has a sovereign
interest in a dispute, application of its own Jaw will not be arbitrary or fundamentally unfair. See id.
(because Minnesota had significant aggregation of contacts with parties and occurrence that created state
interests, applying Minnesota Jaw neither arbitrary nor unfair).
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Suppose, for example, the Court were to rule that full faith and credit to
public acts required simply that each state enforce rights recognized in the
state where the last act necessary to create liability arose. 103 A ruling of this
kind would place considerable reliance on notions of territorial sovereignty,
and would be the very antithesis of the governmental interest analysis favored
by many modem scholars. 104 Yet a ruling of this type would be, in effect, a
decision that the occurrence of the last act within a state gives that state alone
a sovereign interest in having its law applied. 105 No other sovereign would
have the territorially-based interest necessary to claim that a decision against
applying its own rules undermined the state's sovereignty. The sovereign
"interests" involved are not those Professor Currie had in mind, but it is these
interests on which territorialist conflicts doctrine is based. 106
Similarly, if the Supreme Court were to concede that more than one state
might have a sovereign interest in applying its law to a particular dispute, the
103. See Hartford Accident and Indem. Co. v. Delta & Pine Land Co., 292 U.S. 143, 145 (1934)
(choice-of-law analysis in fidelity bond case gave place where bond written controlling interest despite
possibly greater contacts with other state).
104. Professor Brainerd Currie developed a method for resolving choice-of-law cases, a method widely
known as "governmental interest analysis." See generally Currie, The Constitution and the Choice of Law:
Governmental Interests and the Judicial Function, 26 U. CHI. L. REV. 9 (1958). Currie's approach requires
courts to identify the state policies that underlie the competing legal rules before resolving a choice-of-law
dispute. Id. at 9-10. Currie termed these state policies "governmental interests." Id. at 10. For a brief
general description of Currie's method of resolving choice-of-Jaw dispqtes, see W. REESE & M.
ROSENBERG, CASES ON CONFLICT OF LAW 469-72 (7th ed. 1978).
Currie refined his approach through a series of articles. See generally B. CURRIE, SELECTED EssA vs ON
THE CONFLICT OF LAWS (1963) (reprinting most of Professor Currie's articles on governmental interest
methodology). With various modifications, his theory has gained many academic adherents. See generally
Horowitz, The Law of Choice of Law in California: A Restatement, 21 U.C.L.A. L. REV. 719 (1974);
Sedler, Weintraub's Commentary on the Conflict of Laws: The Chapter on Torts, 57 IOWA L. REV. 1229
(1972); Baxter, Choice of Law and the Federal System, 16 STAN. L. REV. I (1963). In addition, the
California Supreme Court has adopted Currie's approach as the predominant method of resolving choiceof-Jaw questions in California. See Bernhard v. Harrah's Club, 16 Cal. 3d 313, 319-21 & n.2, 546 P.2d 719,
722-23 & n.2, 128 Cal. Rptr. 215, 218-19 & n.2 (1976) (applying Currie's methodology to determine
whether California or Nevada law should govern personal injury action).
105. If that state concluded, however, that it had no sovereign interest in the dispute, the full faith and
credit clause provides no warrant for undermining that conclusion. Experience demonstrates, however,
that this situation is unlikely to arise. The Supreme Court has never been asked, under the guise of full faith
and credit, to require an unwilling state to apply its own Jaw.
106. The territorialist theory, which is based on vested rights that accrue upon the occurrence in a
jurisdiction of the last act necesary to create a cause of action, dominated conflicts theory of the first half of
the twentieth century. Its principal champion was Professor Joseph Beale, who served as the Reporter for
the first Restatement. See generally J. BEALE, CoNFLICT Of LAWS (1935); RESTATEMENT OF CONFLICT
OF LAWS Ch. 8 & 9 (1934).
By contrast, Professor Currie's method minimizes the importance of territorial connections in favor of a
policy-oriented approach, with particular significance attached to forum policies. Currie's governmental
interests are those that a "selfish state, concerned only with promoting its own interests" would pursue. B.
CURRIE, SELECTED EssAYS ON THE CONFLICT OF LAWS 89 (1963). According to Currie, when a litigant
invokes a foreign state's law:
the court should, first of all, determine the governmental policy expressed in the Jaw of the
forum. It should then inquire whether the relation of the forum to the case is such as to
provide a legitimate basis for the assertion of an interest in the application of that policy. This
process is essentially the familiar one of construction or interpretation.
Id. at 183-84.
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Court could not resolve the dispute without considering the asserted interest
of the states involved. In such a situation, the Court could, on one hand,
conclude that the dispute must be resolved by weighing those interests. 107
Conversely, the Court could hold that any state with an interest in the
controversy may apply its own rule of decision. 108 In either event, the Court
could proceed only after first deciding whether the choice-of-law question
presented an affront to sovereign interests, however defined, and then
deciding whether despite the full faith and credit clause, the forum state's
interest permitted overriding the sovereign interests of the other states.
Whether the application of a sister state's law would unconstitutionally
frustrate the sovereign interests of a state is a question of federal law. 109 Thus,
the interests of a sovereign state that the full faith and credit clause protects
must be federally defined interests. The role of federal policies or interests in
determining the scope of full faith and credit to public acts is otherwise quite
limited. There are only two issues that are federal in nature. The first is
whether an asserted state interest is a cognizable interest for full faith and
credit purposes. The second is whether the competing state interests should be
weighed or whether the law of any state may be applied without additional
constitutional restriction so long as that state does have an interest. There are
no overriding federal policies that can resolve issues of full faith and credit to
statutes without evaluating state interests. The Supreme Court cannot resolve
questions of full faith and credit to public acts by allowing federal policies to
prevail over the interests of either state, or of both.
B. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO JUDGMENTS

The role of state interests in determinations of full faith and credit to
statutes has been the focus of much judicial consideration. Until the Thomas
case, the Supreme Court had not accorded comparable attention to state
interests in cases involving full faith and credit to judgments. Some notable
dissents have argued that, in certain circumstances, sister-state judgments
that frustrate the interests of the forum state need not receive full faith and
credit. 110 No Court majority, however, has so held.
107. In Alaska Packers Ass'n v. Industrial Accident Comm'n , the Court explained that:
[T]he conflict is to be resolved, not by giving automatic effect to the full faith and credit
clause, compelling the courts of each state to subordinate its own statutes to those of the
other, but by appraising the governmental interests of each jurisdiction, and turning the scale
of decision according to their weight.
294 U.S. 532, 547 (1935).
108. See Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague, 449 U.S. 302, 313 (1981) (state must have significant contact
creating state interests); Nevada v. Hall, 440 U.S. 410, 424 (1979) (forum state had closely related and
substantial interest).
109. A caveat is necessary. If a state disclaims any sovereign interest in having its law applied to a
particular dispute, there is no constitutional reason to override that disclaimer. Only when more than one
jurisdiction asserts a sovereign interest should the resulting conflict implicate federal law.
110. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430,459 (1943) (Black, J., with Douglas, Murphy
& Rutledge, JJ., dissenting) (when two states have interest in workmen's compensation litigation, effect of
decision should be for states to determine); Yarborough v. Yarborough, 290 U.S. 202,219 (1933) (Stone, J.,
with Cardozo, J., dissenting) (full faith and credit does not require obligations of one state to be placed
beyond control of others, without regard to their interests).
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There are two reasons for according full faith and credit to sister-state
judgments even if the interests of the forum state are thereby frustrated. First,
unlike the situation with full faith and credit to public acts, a court can decide
issues of full faith and credit to judgments without weighing state interests. A
blanket rule that the prior judgment binds the parties throughout the United
States resolves disputes without any consideration of state interests. Second,
and more important, a rule permitting a state, on the basis of its own
important interests, to readjudicate matters resolved by a sister-state's
judgments would undermine the federal policies that underlie the full faith
and credit clause. The full faith and credit clause is designed to avoid multiple
and contradictory judgments in the several states. 111 The uncertainty inherent
in a system that allows different courts within one nation to apply different
rules of law to the same dispute is unfortunate. That uncertainty is trivial,
however, when compared to the chaos that would result if different and
contradictory judgments could co-exist in different states within the same
nation. Enforcement problems would abound if the states were free to ignore
judgments of sister states. Parties could not obtain a final determination of
their rights without bringing actions in every state that had the jurisdiction to
entertain them. In short, without some method of eliminating the possibility
of conflicting judgments, the situation would be intolerable.
Nevertheless, the solution to the problem need not require according full
faith and credit to the first valid judgment rendered. Another approach would
be to grant judicial jurisdiction only to the state with the greatest interest in a
particular controversy, or to accord full faith and credit only to judgments
rendered by the state with the greatest interest, however defined. Alternatively, courts could give full faith and credit to determinations of any state with
an interest, whether or not it is the greatest interest. These solutions, however,
would create different problems of significant dimension.
The alternative of permitting only the state with the greatest interest to
make final judicial resolution of a controversy, for example, has several
drawbacks. First, that state's courts may not have jurisdiction over the
case. 112 Second, even if those courts could properly exercise jurisdiction, the
forum might be seriously inconvenient for one or more parties, particularly
for a party with limited resources. Third, ascertaining which state possessed
the greatest interest would require litigation on that issue in every case.
Because the issue would be one of federal law, a final resolution by the
Supreme Court would be necessary in many disputed cases. Of course, even
under established principles, full faith and credit questions are ultimately
federal questions. Nevertheless, the only federal question that currently arises
in most full faith and credit cases-whether the first forum's courts had
jurisdiction 113 -does not approach the complexity of deciding in each case
Ill. Riley v. New York Trust Co., 315 U.S. 343, 348-49(1942).
112. Because the bases for jurisdiction are broader now than they have been in the past, this possibility
is less likely than it once was. The recent case of World-Wide Volkswagen Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286
(1980), however, illustrates that the situation can arise. See id. at 299 (because defendant Jacked adequate
contacts with state in which accident occurred, that state Jacked jurisdiction over products liability action).
113. A second forum is free to re-examine the jurisdictional basis of a sister state's judgment. The
finality of sister state's judgments "does not prevent an inquiry into the jurisdiction of the court in which
the original judgment was given, to pronounce it; or the right of the State itself to exercise authority over
the person or the subject-matter." Thompson v. Whitman, 85 U.S. (18 Wall.) 457, 462 (1874) (quoting J.
STORY, CoMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION (3d ed. Boston 1858)).
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which state has the greatest interest in a particular controversy. Finally, in
light of the Supreme Court's position that even questions of full faith and
credit to statutes do not require a balancing of state interests, 114 it would be
inconsistent to establish an inflexible "state of greatest interest" test for
questions of full faith and credit to judgments. The affront to a state's
sovereignty is likely to be at least as great if the state's judgments, rendered
after due deliberation by competent courts, are ignored because another state
has a greater interest.
Some of these problems would be alleviated if the Court were to require full
faith and credit only for judgments of states with any interest, not necessarily
the greatest interest. This solution would eliminate the inconsistency with the
established law that governs the applicability of full faith and credit to
statutes. Under this approach, the problems of judicial jurisdiction and
inconvenience to parties might be of lesser dimension, but they still would
exist. Most importantly, under this theory a federal question other than the
jurisdictional one would remain, thus requiring a decision as to whether the
first forum had any interest, rather than the greatest interest, in the dispute.
An additional problem is inherent in any attempt to grant full faith and
credit only to judgments of states with an interest or the greatest interest in a
dispute: the need to reduce each case into its component issues. Choice-of-law
theory recognizes that different states may have greater interests in the
different issues that arise in a particular controversy.1 15 Few systems could be
more unwieldy than one that would permit different states to reach final
resolutions of different issues within a particular case. The burden and
inconvenience both to the parties and to the judicial system would be great,
and the confusion intolerable. On the other hand, without a segregation of the
various issues in dispute, an interest analysis would be of dubious utility.
In addition to these practical problems, an interest analysis would present
serious jurisprudential obstacles. Such an approach ignores the sovereign
interests of the several states in adjudicating disputes between parties over
which they have jurisdiction.' 16 Surely the Court would commit a serious
affront to the sovereignty of a state by requiring it to abstain from
adjudicating the rights of two parties seeking redress in its courts on the
ground that another state has a greater interest. The authority to resolve
disputes between parties over whom the sovereign has power is one of the
basic attributes of sovereignty itself. 117 In a federal system, it is one thing to
114. See notes 99-100 supra and accompanying text (explaining Court's refusal to require one state to
defer to the conflicting laws of another state).
115. The Restatement (Second) of Conflict of Laws explains: "The rights and liabilities of the parties
with respect to an issue in tort are determined by the local law of the state which, with respect to that issue,
has the most significant relationship to the occurrence and the parties." RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
CONFLICT OF LAWS § 145 (1971) (emphasis added).
I I 6. When a sister state's statutes alone are involved, it is unnecessary to evaluate a sovereign's
executive or judicial interests: the forum state merely exercises its judicial power in deciding which statutes
ought to be applied. To suggest that a sister state's interest should prevent the forum state from even
hearing the case, however, requires a substantial leap.
117. See generally J. LOCKE, THE SECOND TREATISE OF CIVIL GOVERNMENT, Chapter IX, of the
Ends of Political Society and Government, § 127. Similarly, in Pennoyer v. Neff the Supreme Court stated:
[E]very State possesses exclusive jurisdiction and sovereignty over persons and property
within its territory. As a consequence, every State has the power to determine for itself the
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require that one sovereign state honor adjudications made by another
coordinate state; it is quite another to require that a sovereign state with
power over the parties abstain from dispute resolution entirely, or at best limit
itself to adjudication subject to veto by the courts of a co-equal state. In short,
an interest analysis of full faith and credit for judgments is inconsistent with
our notion of personal jurisdiction and the concept of sovereignty that
underlies it. 11 s
The principal alternative to an interest analysis is a system based, as ours
has been, on uniform adherence to the first judgment rendered by a court with
jurisdiction. This practice satisfies the major requirement of a federal system
by providing a unifying principle that avoids the confusion of conflicting or
contradictory judgments in various states of the union. Moreover, it furthers
other federal policies as well. It keeps duplicative litigation to a minimum by
permitting the first court that may properly exercise jurisdiction to resolve a
dispute finally, instead of deferring to a court in a state posessing a greater
interest in the dispute, or rendering a judgment that will be, in effect, subject
to the review of a sister state's court. In addition, a jurisdiction-based rule
limits significantly the scope of litigation, in both the initial court that renders
judgment as well as courts that entertain challenges to that judgment. No
federal question arises regarding the sufficiency of a state's interest to resolve
a dispute. Thus, a jurisdiction-based rule assures smooth functioning of the
federal system by reducing both the number and the complexity of matters
litigated in multiple cases.
These advantages, of course, exact a price. In some cases, a state with an
interest in a particular dispute will be foreclosed from considering a dispute
by an earlier adjudication in a state having an interest of equal, or possibly
lesser, significance. It is this price that a plurality of the Supreme Court was
unwilling to pay in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. In an opinion which,
narrowly construed, applies only to workmen's compensation awards, Justice
Stevens indicated that an interested state need not be bound by all determinations made in a sister-state proceeding, but only by determinations of fact. 119
Thus, the opinion attempted to reconcile the interests of individual states. If,
as appears likely, the Court intended this reconcilitation to apply only to
civil status and capacities of its inhabitants.... [T]o enforce an extra-territorial jurisdiction by
a [sister state's] tribunals, would be deemed an encroachment upon the independence of the
State in which the persons are domiciled or the property is situated, and be resisted as
usurpation.
95 U.S. 714, 722-23 (1878).
118. In the context of personal jurisdiction, the Supreme Court recently explained:
[T]he Framers . . . intended that the States retain many essential attributes of sovereignty,
including, in particular, the sovereign power to try causes in their courts. The sovereignty of
each State, in turn, implied a limitation on the sovereignty of all of its Sister States-a
limitation express or implicit in both the original scheme of the Constitution and the
Fourteenth Amendment.
World-Wide Volkswagon Corp. v. Woodson, 444 U.S. 286, 293 (1980). See also Hanson v. Denckla, 357
U.S. 235, 251 (1958) (restrictions on personal jurisdiction consequence of territorial limitations on power of
states).
119. See 448 U.S. at 281 (" unexceptionable" full faith and credit principle that resolutions of factual
matters underlying judgment must be given same res judicata effect in forum as they have in rendering
state).
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workmen's compensation awards or even to all administrative determinations, 120 the distinction between those and other judgments rests on shaky
foundations. 121 If, on the other hand, the opinion's reach is broader, extending
to all judgments, Thomas fails to consider how so limiting the scope of full
faith and credit will frustrate federal interests.
Justice Stevens began his "fresh examination of the full faith and credit
issue" 122 in Thomas by noting that "[t]hree different state interests are
affected by the potential conflict between Virginia and the District of
Columbia." 123 Although he ultimately concluded that permitting the District
of Columbia to make a supplementary award of workmen's compensation
benefits would frustrate no state interest of Virginia, 124 Justice Stevens never
addressed the federal interests that were frustrated by upholding the second
award. This is particularly surprising because in the same opinion, Justice
Stevens rejected the rationale of Mccartin as an "unwarranted delegation to
the States of this Court's responsibility for the final arbitration of full faith
and credit questions." 125 Stripped to its essentials, however, Mccartin stood
only for the proposition that if a state expressly disavows an interest in
precluding subsequent supplementary workmen's compensation awards, sister states, out of respect for the disavowed interest, need not refrain from
making such awards. 126 If the Supreme Court's role in full faith and credit
cases is limited to evaluating the interests of the several states, the McCartin
rule is an eminently sensible one. There can be no reason for the Supreme
Court to conclude that a particular state has an interest in precluding
supplementary awards if that state itself has expressly disclaimed such an
interest. 127
The foregoing discussion does not suggest that the Mccartin rule is
analytically defensible. The rule is indefensible not because states should be
prevented from deciding conclusively that they have no interest in precluding
further litigation, but because the interests of the rendering state are not the
only interests that dictate against relitigating issues. Federal policies and
interests are involved, and it is those policies and interests that are embodied
in the full faith and credit clause. Even if a particular state were unconcerned
with the effect of its judgments in sister states, the federal interest in assuring
the smooth functioning of the federal system nationwide would require that
judgments of that state be given effect elsewhere. As Reese and Johnson wrote
more than thirty years ago, "[f]ull faith and credit is a national policy, not a
state policy. Its purpose is not merely to demand respect from one state for
120. The Thomas Court summarized its holding as follows: "The Full Faith and Credit Clause should
not be construed to preclude successive workmen's compensation awards." Id. at 286. In his analysis ,
however, Justice Stevens discussed the limitations of administrative tribunals generally, thereby implying
that Thomas applies equally to all administrative decisions. See id. at 281-82 (discussing differences
between court judgments and administrative determinations).
121. See notes 164-80 infra and accompanying text (criticizing attempts to distinguish administrative
from judicial proceedings in application of full faith and credit).
122. 448 U .S. at 277.
123. Id.; see note 78 and accompanying text (interests include placing limit on employer's liability,
providing employee with adequate remedy, and upholding integrity of first state's decision).
124. Id. at 284.
125. Id. at 271.
126. See notes 50-56 supra and accompanying text (discussing McCartin holding).
127. See notes 102-10 supra and accompanying text (discussing analogous problem with full faith and
credit to statutes).
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another, but rather to give us the benefits of a unified nation by altering the
status of otherwise independent, sovereign states"12s
In light of the federal policies that Justice Stevens ignored, the position he
took in Thomas loses much of its appeal. Conflicting judgments, regardless of
whether they arise from the application of differing rules of law or different
findings of fact, equally undermine the policy of national unification. The
resulting disorder in the federal system is no greater in one case than in the
other. Litigation in one state would not finally determine the rights of the
parties as long as the same set of facts might give rise to different legal
consequences in the courts of another state. In most circumstances, there
would be no means of choosing between the judgments of the two states
unless the Supreme Court could conclude as a matter of federal law that the
judgments of one state would frustrate sovereign interests of the other, but not
the reverse.
As long as the full faith and credit clause is viewed as an instrument for
implementing the federal policy of national unification, determining the
extent of state interests remains an issue of diminished importance. A reading
of the Supreme Court precedents until Thomas leads to the conclusion not
only that state interests are less significant than federal policies but that they
might be irrelevant entirely.1 29 Only competing federal policies, therefore,
would justify failing to give effect to a sister state's judgment. One need not go
that far, however, to conclude that Justice Stevens' analysis in Thomas, if
intended to apply beyond workmen's compensation awards, misses almost
entirely the point of the full faith and credit clause.
Moreover, as long as the Supreme Court continues to view full faith and
credit to public acts as a relatively insignificant restriction on the constitutional power of the forum state to apply its own law, 130 requiring the
enforcement of sister-state judgments will cause little additional frustration of
sovereign interests. The Court's unwillingness to federalize choice-of-law
questions through the full faith and credit clause indicates a lack of federal
concern with frustration of state interests caused by the application of the law
of a state having less interest than a sister state. If the needs of the federal
128. Reese & Johnson, supra note 61, at 161-62, quoted in Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co., 448
U.S. at 271 n.15.
129. See, e.g., Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 438 (1943) (no considerations of local
policy sufficient to impair force that full faith and credit clause gives to judgments); Yarborough v.
Yarborough, 290 U .S. 202, 212 (1933) (alimony decree binding under full faith and credit clause despite
second state's interest in providing increased award to its resident); Fauntleroy v. Lum, 210 U.S. 230, 23637 (1908) (judgment on gambling debt binding under full faith and credit clause despite illegality of
contract in second state). In Williams v. North Carolina the Supreme Court explained the applicability of
the full faith and credit clause to divorce decrees in these terms:
It is objected, however, that if such divorce decrees must be given full faith and credit, a
substantial dilution of the sovereignty of other states will be effected. For it is pointed out that
under such a rule one state's policy of strict control over the institution of marriage could be
thwarted by the decree of a more lax state. But such an objection goes to the application of the
full faith and credit clause to many situations. It is an objective in varying degrees of intensity
to the enforcement of a judgment of a sister state based on a cause of action which could not
be enforced in the state of the forum. . . . Such is part of the price of our federal system.

317 U.S. 287, 302 (1942).
130. See note 97 supra and accompanying text (full faith and credit does not require one state to
substitute another state's laws for its own).
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system do not prevent a forum state from so frustrating a sister state's greater
interest there is also no federal reason to prevent frustration of sister-state
interests by enforcing everywhere the forum judgment that is based on forum
law. 131
Requiring enforcement of sister state judgments, whatever law the sister
state may have applied, generally does not create significant unfairness for
parties or potential parties to litigation, a concern of comparable significance.
The party who brings the original action normally has some choice of forum,
at least when more than one state has a significant interest in the outcome of
the litigation. Although the constitutional power of the state to apply its own
law to a particular dispute does not necessarily imply judicial jurisdiction in
that state, 132 in most cases a state with a significant interest in applying its
own law is likely to possess jurisdiction as well. 133 If a plaintiff has sufficient
faith in the judicial process of a particular state to submit his claim to
litigation there, he ought not later be able to complain of the resolution of that
dispute. This is particularly true when the plaintiff could have brought his
action in another state.
The same argument, of course, does not apply to a defendant in the first
litigation, except perhaps if jurisdiction in that action depended upon his
express consent. Whatever the effect accorded to sister-state judgments, as
long as states are free in most instances to apply their own laws, defendants
must submit to an adjudication based on the law of the plaintitrs chosen
forum. Even if a sister state were not obliged to enforce such a judgement, the
defendant would still be subject to the original forum's enforcement mechanisms. If the forum state has applied its law to an unwilling defendant in this
manner, requiring sister states to enforce the first forum's judgment will
represent a minimal incremental imposition.
The preceding discussion does not suggest that parties will never suffer
prejudice as a result of the enforcement of sister-state judgments. It suggests
only that in light of other impositions already condoned in our federal system,
the prejudice some parties would endure as a result of such a rule would not
be unreasonable. In addition, full faith and credit to public acts, and perhaps
due process, 134 protect both the parties and interested states from at least the
13 I. The Court's choice-of-law decisions place few limits on the ability of the forum state to apply its
own law to a case in its courts. See note 95 supra and accompanying text (discussing Court's deference to
state's choice oflaw). The Court, therefore, is willing·to frustrate sovereign interests of sister states even in
disputes that have relatively little connection with the forum. Permitting the sister state to ignore the forum
judgment would significantly alleviate that frustration, but the cost to the federal system in permitting such
a course would be quite high.
132. See note 112 supra and accompanying text (discussing possibility that state possessing greatest
interest may lack jurisdiction over dispute).
133. This generally will be true except in instances where the primary basis for a state's application of
its own law is the plaintiffs domicile, an insufficient basis for judicial jurisdiction. See International Shoe
Co. v. Washington, 326 U.S. 310,316 (1945) (court may obtain jurisdiction over defendant only ifhe has
minimum contacts with forum state). See also Martin, Personal Jurisdiction and Choice of Law, 78 MICH.
L. REV. 872, 879 (1980) (suggesting minimum contacts test for legislative jurisdiction).
134. The majority and concurring opinions in Allstate Ins. Co. v. Hague discuss the interplay between
the two clauses in the choice-of-law area. See 449 U.S. 302, 320 (1981) (full faith and credit and due process
clauses satisfied when application of law neither arbitrary nor unfair); id. at 323-26 (Stevens, J.,
concurring) (full faith and credit protects federal interest in national unity; due process ensures fairness to
litigants). See also Kirgis, supra note 100, at 96, 110 (full faith and credit prevents excessive provincialism;
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grossest forms of parochialism on the part of sister states. These considerations together indicate that from the standpoint of the parties, enforcement of
sister-state judgments, whatever the law applied, is not inherently unfair.
C. SUMMARY

The role of state interests in full faith and credit cases should, and until the
Thomas case unquestionably did, depend on whether the issue involved full
faith and credit to public acts or full faith and credit to judicial proceedings.
In the context of full faith and credit to public acts, an analysis of state
interests is necessary to determine the obligations of sister states. The same is
not true, however, with respect to full faith and credit to judicial proceedings.
Evaluating the interests of individual states in determining whether sisterstate judgments must be enforced is not only unnecessary, but also inconsistent with the basic needs of the federal system. The long accepted, if sometimes
qualified, rule is that a judgment rendered by a court with judicial jurisdiction
must be enforced in every sister state, whatever the interests of the sister state.
Implicit in that rule is the recognition that full faith and credit is a federal
policy designed to ensure national unification, and a policy to which
competing state policies or interests must be subordinated. No superior
alternative to the established rule has emerged that would not involve the
subordination of federal full faith and credit policies.
Ill. FULL FAITH AND CREDIT TO ADMINISTRATIVE PROCEEDINGS

An alternative explanation for the plurality's conclusion in Thomas is
Justice Stevens' apparent rejection of the Magnolia premise 135 that administrative adjudications are entitled to the same res judicata effect as court
judgments. 136 In Magnolia, even the Louisiana Court of Appeals, despite its
denial of full faith and credit to the Texas workmen's compensation award,
recognized that the award stood on the same footing as a court judgment. 137
Although the United States Supreme Court reversed, the Court reaffirmed
that principle.13s
In Thomas, however, Justice Stevens wrote that "the critical differences
between a court of general jurisdiction and an administrative agency with
limited statutory authority forecloses [sic] the conclusion that constitutional
rules applicable to court judgments are necessarily applicable to workmen's
due process prevents unfairness and arrogation of power); Martin, Constitutional Limitations, supra note
100, at 192 (full faith and credit regulates relations among states; due process regulates relations between
state and individual); Reese, Legislative Jurisdiction, 78 CoLUM. L. REV. 1587, 1590 (1987) (full faith and
credit operates affirmatively to compel states to entertain certain suits or apply certain laws; due process
operates negatively to forbid application of law without reasonable basis).
135. Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 443 (1943).
136. See 448 U.S. at 281 (Magnolia's reliance on precedent as requiring that workmen's compenS<1,tion
awards stand on same footing as court judgments unwarranted).
137. Hunt v. Magnolia Petroleum Co., 10 So. 2d 109, 112-13 (La. Ct. App. 1942), rev'd, 320 U.S. 430
(1943).
138. See 320 U.S. at 443 (regardless of whether accident board proceeding a "judicial proceeding" or
"record," Texas award entitled to full faith and credit in Louisiana).
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compensation awards." 139 This statement warrants further analysis in light of
existing case law and the policies behind full faith and credit.
A. THE CASE LAW: SCHENDEL, MAGNOLIA AND McCARTIN

Chicago, Rock Island & Pacific Railway v. Schendel, 140 decided in 1926,
provided precedent for the Court's statement in Magnolia that workmen's
compensation awards are entitled to the same full faith and credit as court
judgments. 141 The plurality in Thomas, however, read Schendel narrowly, as
holding only that factual findings of state administrative tribunals are entitled
to the same res judicata effect as findings by a court. 142
In Schendel a railroad's negligence caused the death of one employee,
Hope, and the injury of another, Elder. 143 For each employee, the railroad
instituted an administrative proceeding under the Iowa workmen's compensation statute. 144 Both Hope's widow and Elder responded by asserting that
the state law did not apply because the company and its employees were
engaged in interstate commerce at the time of the accident. 145 They brought
actions in Minnesota, seeking recovery under the Federal Employers' Liability Act (FELA), 146 which requires as a jurisdictional predicate a finding that
employer and employee were engaged in interstate commerce. 147
Before completion of the trial on the FELA claim in Minnesota, the Iowa
administrative tribunal found that Hope had been engaged only in intrastate
commerce, and awarded compensation to his widow.1 48 After administrative
and judicial review, judgment was entered affirming the compensation
award. 149 Months later, the FELA action resulted in a judgment for the
employee.1 50 The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed, thereby rejecting the
railroad's contention that under the full faith and credit clause the Minnesota
courts were not permitted to relitigate the jurisdictional issue that already had
been resolved in the Iowa compensation proceeding. 151 The other Iowa
administrative proceeding, involving the employee Elder had not yet reached
its conclusion when the Minnesota court rendered a judgment in Eider's favor
on his FELA claim. 152 The Minnesota Supreme Court again affirmed. 153
139. 448 U.S. at 281.
140. 270 U.S. 611 (1926).
141. See id. at 617 (state determination of applicability of state workmen's compensation law barred
subsequent action under federal law in another state).
142. See 448 U.S. at 281 (Schendel involved "unexceptionable" full faith and credit principle that
resolutions of factual matters underlying judgment must be given same res judicata effect they would have
in rendering state).
143. 270 U.S. at 612.
144. Id. at 614, 622-23.
145. Id. at 614, 623. Although coverage under the Iowa workmen's compensation law is elective, both
Elder and Hope had chosen to be covered. Id. at 613.
146. Pub. L. No. 60-101 , 71 Stat. 65 (1908) (current version at 45 U.S.C. § 51 (1976)).
147. Id.
148. 270 U.S. at 613.
149. Id. at 614-15.
150. Id. at 615.
151. Id. Significantly, even the Minnesota Supreme Court, which had permitted relitigation of the
jurisdictional issue, had not differentiated between judicial and workmen's compensation proceedings. See
generally id. at 615.
152. 163 Minn. 457, 458, 204 N .W. 557, 558 (1925), affd, 210 U.S. 611 , 623 (1926).
153. Id., 204 N .W. at 558.
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The United States Supreme Court affirmed Elder and reversed, on full faith
and credit grounds, the Hope decision. 154 The Court concluded that in Elder
there was not yet an administrative award enforceable in the Iowa courts at
the time of the Minnesota FELA judgment and therefore the Minnesota
courts were entitled to reach an independent determination. 155 Res judicata
principles and, derivatively, full faith and credit principles did not bar Eider's
claim because of the absence of a final judgment. 156 In the Hope case,
however, where there was an enforceable award and even a court judgment
affirming the award, the Court concluded that "[t]he Iowa court . . . having
adjudicated the character of the commerce in which the deceased was
engaged, that matter, whether rightly decided or not, must be taken as
conclusively established, so long as the judgment remains unmodified." 157
According to the Thomas plurality, Schendel articulated no more than the
"unexceptionable full faith and credit principle" that determinations of fact
made in one state's proceeding are entitled to the same res judicata effect in
sister states as in the rendering state. 158 The Thomas plurality characterized
the Iowa determination that Hope had been engaged in intrastate commerce
as a factual finding.1s9
The conclusion that Hope was engaged in intrastate commerce, however, is
not merely a finding of fact. It is at least a mixed conclusion of law and fact
that embraced both the factual determination that Hope performed certain
activities within Iowa and the legal conclusion that certain legal consequences
attached to these activities. 160 It is the legal aspect of this mixed conclusion
that prevented the Minnesota courts from relitigating the issue.
An illustration may provide clarification. Suppose in the Iowa proceeding
the tribunal had found only that for five days before his accident, Hope had
been working exclusively in Iowa on a project within Iowa. Suppose this
finding were necessary to support a particular remedy within Iowa, but the
magic words "intrastate commerce" were never attached to the finding. The
Iowa finding would not bar a Minnesota court faced with an action brought
under FELA from concluding that the employee was nevertheless injured in
the course of interstate commerce. First, the Minnesota court could find that
other facts, neither litigated in nor relevant to the Iowa proceeding placed the
154.
155.
156.
157.
158.
159.

270 U.S. at 615.
Id. at 622-23.
Id. at 623.
Id. at 617.
448 U.S. at 281.
Id.
160. The demarcation between issues of fact and issues of law is not clear. See RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68, Comment j (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977) (often impossible to draw line
between "ultimate facts," or issues of law, and evidentiary facts); cf Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co.,
448 U.S. at 288 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (dispositive issues in
tort actions frequently mixed questions of law and fact; actions satisfying one state's standard of care might
be negligent in another state). Issues sometimes characterized as issues of "ultimate fact" actually involve
the application of law to fact. If, however, a particular tribunal's determination rests on its application of
law to fact, and therefore on its interpretation of the law it applies, a requirement that the tribunal's
determination be given effect in subsequent proceedings carries with it the power of the initial tribunal to
bind subsequent courts on issues of law. If this is true, there is little reason to prevent the tribunal from
binding subsequent courts on other issues of law, even when they are divorced from issues of fact.
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employment within the scope of "interstate commerce." 161 Alternatively, the
court could conclude that even on the same facts, the employment was within
the scope of interstate commerce, and therefore created obligations under
FELA. Such a conclusion might constitute reversible error as an incorrect
interpretation of FELA, but not as a denial of full faith and credit to the Iowa
determination.162
The Schendel case differs from the illustration because of the legal
conclusion in the Iowa proceeding that only intrastate commerce was
involved, and therefore that FELA did not preempt state law on the subject.
It is only that legal conclusion that prevented relitigation of the issue in
Minnesota. The Supreme Court's holding in Schendel that the full faith and
credit clause prohibited relitigation implies, therefore, that conclusions of
law, not just findings of fact, rendered in administrative proceedings are
entitled to full faith and credit. The plurality's analysis in Thomas missed this
point.
Moreover, the Schendel opinion suggested no distinction between judicial
and administrative proceedings. Nothing in Justice Sutherland's opinion
implies that any less faith and credit is due administrative determinations
than judicial ones. Throughout the opinion, he made references to the "Iowa
court," 163 the "Iowa judgment," 164 and the "judicial power" 165 exercised
under the Iowa workmen's compensation statute. One might ipfer that the
Court accorded full faith and credit only to the Iowa court judgment that
affirmed the workmen's compensation award, and not the award itself, but
the Court dispelled that inference in its discussion of the Elder case. Had it
wished to distinguish administrative from judicial proceedings, the Court
could have rested its decision on that ground because no court had rendered
judgment in Eider's workmen's compensation proceeding. Instead, the Court
emphasized that because of the pendency of administrative review, Elder had
received no enforceable administrative award. 166 Any distinction between
final administrative awards and judgments .enforcing those awards is senseless, as Justice White pointed out in his Thomas concurrence, 167 if its only
effect is to force cautious litigants concerned about the full faith and credit
161. Suppose, for instance, that Hope had worked outside Iowa for twenty of the twenty-five days
preceding his accident, and that his job entailed moving constantly from project to project to assist in
particular aspects of his employer's business. No res judicata or collateral estoppel doctrine would prevent
the Minnesota courts from considering these facts and concluding that Hope was engaged in interstate
commerce. See generally RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 68 (Tent. Draft No. 4, 1977).
162. The facts found in the hypothetical Iowa proceeding possess no intrinsic significance. They are
significant in the subsequent Minnesota proceeding only to the extent that FELA makes them significant.
The Iowa proceeding, however, never determined the significance of the facts found for FELA purposes.
The Minnesota court is, therefore, free to make that determination for itself. If it errs by attaching too little
significance to the facts found in Iowa, while conceding that those facts have been established, its error is
merely one of interpreting FELA. It is FELA, not the Iowa proceeding, that determines the significance of
the Iowa facts for FELA purposes.
163. 270 U.S. at 617.
164. Id. at 616, 618.
165. Id. at 616.
166. Id. at 623.
167. See 448 U.S. at 286 (White, J ., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J., concurring in judgment) (plurality's
rule must allow subsequent recovery even if award upheld by court; otherwise employers would simply
seek judicial review in first forum).
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effect of administrative awards to seek judicial confirmation of administrative
action.
In sum, there is little support in Schendel itself for the Thomas plurality's
interpretation of that case. Moreover, in Magnolia the Supreme Court treated
Schendel as if it had placed administrative determinations on the same footing
as court judgments for full faith and credit purposes. 168 It is significant that
even in Mccartin, despite the Court's evident desire to abandon Magnolia,
and despite its perversion of full faith and credit principles to distinguish the
case, the Court did not retreat from the position that final administrative
adjudications are entitled to the same full faith and credit as court judgments.169
B. THE POLICY BASES

The Thomas plurality concluded that "the critical differences" between
courts of general jurisdiction and administrative agencies justified different
treatment for full faith and credit purposes. 170 In order to be "critical,"
however, any differences must implicate the basic policy behind the full faith
and credit clause-the need for national unification within the context of a
federal system.
If national unification is at the heart of the full faith and credit clause,
whether a determination issues from an administrative body is of no
importance. As long as a state employs a method of resolving disputes that is
constitutionally adequate, the state's resolutions should be no less binding
168. See Magnolia Petroleum Co. v. Hunt, 320 U.S. 430, 446 (1943) (citing Schendel for proposition
that workmen's compensation award stands on same footing as judgment).
169. Cf. Industrial Comm'n v. Mccartin, 330 U.S. at 630 (employee's reservation of rights in second
state distinguished award from "ordinary judgment or decree") (emphasis added). Also relevant to tne
issue of full faith and credit to administrative determinations is Broderick v. Rosner, 294 U.S. 629 (1935).
In the Broderick case, New York's Superintendent of Banks brought an action in the New Jersey courts to
recover assessments he had levied, pursuant to New York Jaw, against stockholders of the Bank of the
United States who resided in New Jersey. Id. at 638. The New Jersey courts, citing a New Jersey statute,
refused to entertain the action, and the plaintiff-Superintendent appealed to the Supreme Court. Id. at 639.
In an opinion by Justice Brandeis, the Supreme Court reversed and held that the full faith and credit
clause required New Jersey to entertain the action. Id. at 643. It did not decide what effect the
Superintendent's assessments need be given in the New Jersey proceedings. Id. at 646. The Court did,
however, make several assertions that bear on the problem. Justice Brandeis wrote:

The fact that the assessment here in question was made under statutory direction by an
administrative officer does not preclude the application of the full faith and credit clause. If
the assessment had been made in a liquidation proceeding conducted by a court, New Jersey
would have been obliged to enforce it, although the stockholders sued had not been made
parties to the proceedings, and, being nonresidents, could not have been personally served
with process.
Id. at 644. Justice Brandeis based these conclusions on the requirement that sister states give full credit to
"public acts," not to judgments. Id. If that conclusion is sound, the Broderick discussion serves only to
limit state choice-of-law decisions. Only the state of incorporation may impose liabilities on stockholders of
domestic corporations, and if Justice Brandeis' analysis of the Broderick problem is correct, that liability
must be enforced in all states. If full faith and credit to public acts does not extend so far, however, perhaps
Justice Brandeis' conclusions can be supported under the principles of full faith and credit to judgments.
The court did not reach these questions.
170. 448 U.S. at 281.
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because the rendering tribunal is not a traditional court. It is the determination, not the determiner, that requires full faith and credit.
There are, of course, differences between courts established as a part of the
judicial branch of government and administrative agencies operating within
the executive branch. Perhaps if the full faith and credit clause were intended
to foster respect for sister-state judgments, rather than to further national
unification, there might be reason to accord greater respect to a judicial
determination than to a less formal administrative decision. Even the Thomas
plurality, however, was unwilling to adopt that basis for full faith and
credit. 171 Whatever differences there may be between state courts and state
administrative tribunals, those differences do not appear to possess any
federal constitutional significance. State governments are free to distribute the
judicial business of the state among the various branches of state govenment
as they see fit without restriction by the federal Constitution. If an individual
state chooses to vest some or most of what has been traditionally judicial
power in administrative agencies, that choice ought not to carry federal
constitutional implications. Separation of powers in state government, in
contrast to the federal government, is not a matter of federal constitutional
law. 172 A state's choice to vest decisionmaking power in a body not called a
court should not render that body's determinations less entitled to enforcement in sister states.
Administrative bodies issue a wide variety of determinations that are not at
all like court judgments. Not all of these determinations, many of them
legislative in nature, others made ex parte, can or should be enforceable in
sister states. Traditional full faith and credit principles, however, should
suffice to prevent enforcement of administrative determinations when enforcement would be unfair or unconstitutional. 173 Unless the administrative
171. See id. at 284-85 (compensation proceedings should be informal to accommodate state interest in
providing efficient recovery).
172. Aside from the guarantee clause, which requires the United States to guarantee every state a
republican form of government, U.S. CONST. art. IV,§ 4, the United States Constitution docs not prescribe
any particular form of government for its constituent states. Of course, individual state constitutions may
require the same separation of powers embodied in the United States Constitution for the federal
government. The scope of the separation of powers doctrine in any individual state, however, is a matter of
state law.
173. Perhaps the foremost protection is the general full faith and credit principle that a determination is
conclusive in a sister state only to the extent that it is conclusive in the state of its rendition. See 28 U.S.C. §
1738 (1976) (acts, records and judicial proceedings entitled to same full faith and credit as in state of
rendition). The res judicata principles of the individual states provide a safeguard against unwarranted
enforcement of administrative determinations in sister states. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JuooMENTS § 131 (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980), which provides, in part:
A determination by an administrative tribunal is conclusive under the rules of res judicata
only insofar as the proceeding resulting in the determination entailed the essential elements of
adjudication, including: (a) Adequate notice to persons who are to be bound by the
adjudication . .. ; (b) The right ... to present evidence and legal argument . . . and fair
opportunity to rebut evidence and argument . . .; (c) A formulation of issues and law and fact
in terms of the application of rules with respect to specified parties concerning a specific
transaction, situation, or status, or a specific series thereof; (d) A rule of finality . .. ; and (e)
Such other procedural elements as may be necessary to constitute the proceeding a sufficient
means of conclusively determining the matter in question . . ..
Id.
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body has a basis for personal jurisdiction over the parties and complies with
constitutional notice requirements, for example, its determination need not,
and indeed may not, be accorded full faith and credit. 174 Similarly, if the
administrative determination is not final, but remains subject to review or to
modification by the agency, traditional full faith and credit principles would
not require sister-state enforcement. 175 The principle remains simple: a state's
choice to delegate decisionmaking authority to one body rather than another
should be of no importance for full faith and credit purposes; what is
significant is the nature of the decision itself.
C. THE LIMITED JURISDICTION OF ADMINISTRATIVE BODIES

The Thomas opinion emphasized one characteristic of the Industrial
Commission of Virginia that does distinguish it from courts of general
jurisdiction: the commission's jurisdiction "is limited to questions arising
under the Virginia Workmen's Compensation Act." 176 The commission,
therefore, lacked the power to evaluate the claim that Thomas was entitled to
compensation under the law of the District of Columbia. Justice Stevens
concluded that "[s]ince [the commission] was not requested, and had no
authority, to pass on petitioner's rights under District of Columbia law, there
can be no constitutional objection to a fresh adjudication of those rights." 177
Justice Stevens' conclusion, despite its great superficial appeal, proves too
much. First, limited jurisdiction is not a quality peculiar to administrative
bodies. Numerous state courts, such as small claims courts or probate courts,
are limited in jurisdiction either by amount in controversy or by subject
matter. Judgments of these courts are no less entitled to full faith and credit
because of their limited jurisdiction. The plurality's rationale in Thomas
would require that these judgments, too, be treated differently from judgments of courts of general jurisdiction.
Moreover, describing the Virginia commission as having limited jurisdiction is somewhat misleading. Generally, a court of limited jurisdiction is
deprived of judicial power that instead is allocated to some other court or
courts within the state. If such a court of limited jurisdiction is not authorized
to deal with a particular matter or if the court's determinations are subject to
de novo review by another body within the state, full faith and credit would
not require a sister state to accord any more effect to the determinations than
it would receive in the rendering state. Because the determination of the court
of limited jurisdiction might not exhaust the judicial process available within
the state of rendition, the full faith and credit clause, with its purpose of
fostering national unification, also would not prevent relitigation in other
states.
174. See Hanson v. Denckla, 357 U.S. 235, 255 (1958) (Delaware court entitled to refuse full faith and
credit to Florida judgment because Florida without jurisdiction over indispensable party to original
action).
175. See Sistare v. Sistare, 218 U.S. I, 26 (1910) (absolute judgment for alimony not subject to
modification in rendering state entitled to full faith and credit. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF
JUOOMENTS § 131(2), Comment e (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980) (requirement of finality applies to
determinations of administrative agency; to determine finality, reference must be made to procedures of
agency).
176. 448 U.S. at 282.
177. Id. at 283.
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The Virginia Commission, however, does not have limited jurisdiction in
this sense. No other court or agency in Virginia has power to provide any
remedy in a case within the scope of the Workmen's Compensation Act. The
Virginia legislature has granted to the commission the exclusive power to deal
with workmen's compensation cases. 178 Whatever remedy is available in
Virginia is available through the commission.
In furtherance of the goal of national unity, other states should honor the
Virginia Commission's disposition of any dispute. This conclusion is subject
to criticism because it deprives a litigant in Thomas' position of the right to
litigate any choice-of-law questions and any issues of substantive law of states
other than Virginia. This deprivation, however, is not due to the limited
jurisdiction of the administrative body. Virginia could have accomplished the
same result by providing, either legislatively or judicially, a choice-of-law rule
requiring the application of Virginia law in all workmen's compensation
claims that stem from an injury in Virginia. Such a choice-of-law rule would,
whatever its wisdom, be entirely constitutional. 179 A judgment of a Virginia
court of general jurisdiction rendered according to the terms of such a rule
effectively would foreclose the right of an injured workman to litigate any
issues, choice-of-law or substantive, that the workman would like to raise in
any other state.
Because constitutional limitations on choice-of-law remain relatively insignificant, any state that chooses to be provincial in its choice-of-law doctrine
can, through the full faith and credit clause, impose its provinciality on other
states and on any litigants who proceed to judgment within the state. There
appears, therefore, to be little additional unfairness in precluding further
litigation after an initial determination by an administrative agency that lacks
the power to make choice-of-law decisions. Any possible unfairness results
from the wide latitude that the Constitution permits the states in making
choice-of-law decisions, not from the limited jurisdiction of administrative
agencies. 180
178. See VA. CODE§ 65; 1-92 (1980) (all questions arising under act determined by commission).
179. See Pacific Employers Ins. Co. v. Industrial Accident Comm'n, 306 U.S. 493, 500-501 (1939)
(state where injury occurred may apply own compensation law rather than that where state employer and
employee resided and contracted).
180. As additional support for its proposition that a litigant before an administrative body lacking
power to make choice-of-law determinations should be able to relitigate those issues, the Thomas plurality
cited a tentative draft of the Second Restatement of Judgments. 448 U.S. at 283 n.29. Section 61.2(c) of the
Restatement sets forth an exception to the general rule that claims are extinguished in a judgment. Under
the Restatement a claim is not extinguished when,
the plaintiff was unable to rely on a certain theory of the case or to seek a certain remedy or
form of relief in the first action because of the limitations on the subject matter jurisdictions of
the courts . .. and the plaintiff desires in the second action to rely on that theory or to seek
that remedy . . . .
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 61.2(l)(c) (Tent. Draft No. 5, 1978).
The Restatement provision cited in Thomas in fact does not directly support the Thomas analysis: the
provision concerns the res judicata effect of a judgment within a state, not the extraterritorial effect of a
judgment mandated by the full faith and credit clause. The issues of the intrastate and extraterritorial
effects of judgments are not only different, they are not even analogous. When a state divides jurisdiction
among its courts in a fashion that prevents a litigant from raising all claims in one court, there is no
implication that the state intends to force the litigant to choose from among his claims. Instead, the state
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In sum, although the limited jurisdiction of administrative bodies provides
a superficially attractive basis for permitting sister states to relitigate issues
resolved in the original forum, the Thomas plurality's analysis of the issue
does not withstand close scrutiny. Moreover, the Thomas opinion provides no
alternative basis for distinguishing between court judgments and administrative determinations for full faith and credit purposes.
CONCLUSION

Thomas v. Washington Gas Light Co. presented the Supreme Court with a
difficult problem. An injured workman had sought and received compensation for his injury in a forum less generous to him than another available
forum. The workman did this, in all probability, because he was poorly
advised or not advised at all. The natural tendency of any court would be to
avoid punishing the injured workman for mistakes resulting from his lack of
legal sophistication. As Justice Rehnquist noted in dissent, had the employee
been the victim of employer coercion in any way, the case would have been
simple because the Virginia statute would have permitted a court to vacate the
award. 181 Even in the absence of an employer's abuse of greater bargaining
power, the employee's case is a sympathetic one.
The Thomas plurality pursued two paths in its attempt to permit plaintiff
to secure additional relief. Unfortunately, the plurality failed to acknowledge
that both paths led to dead ends. Instead, the Court raised a panoply of full
faith and credit questions to which it has provided no satisfactory answers.
First, the plurality's attempt at balancing state interests was both unprecedented and unwarranted in the context of granting full faith and credit to
has merely assigned some claims to one forum and others to a different forum, with the logical implication,
recognized by the Restatement, that a judgment in the first forum should not extinguish claims that the
state mandates must be heard in a different forum.
In stark contrast, the delegation to a workmen's compensation commission of the judicial power to
adjudicate employees' claims is a decision by the state to foreclose plaintiff from seeking additional relief. It
is not the limited jurisdiction of the court or administrative body that prevents plaintiff from seeking relief
in the first action; it is the decision by the state not to authorize any judicial or administrative body,
including a court of general jurisdiction, to provide relief other than the relief available in the first forum.
The Restatement provision, then, is not relevant to the analysis offered in the Thomas opinion. The
argument of the plurality is weakened further by reliance on section 131 of the Second Restatement of
Judgments, which specifically deals with administrative adjudications. That provision does not include a
provision parallel to· section 61.2(l)(c), despite the greater likelihood that "limited jurisdiction" problems
will arise in connection with administrative determinations. The only relevant exceptions included in
section 13 I are those stated in subsection (4):
[A]dministrative determinations should not be given preclusive effect: if according preclusive
effect to determination of the issue would be incompatible with a legislative policy that:
(a) The determinations of the tribunal adjudicating the issue be specially expeditious; or
(b) The tribunal in which the issue subsequently arises be free to make an independent
determination of the issue in question.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF JUDGMENTS § 131(4) (Tent. Draft No. 7, 1980).
In Thomas, neither of these exceptions would avail the injured workmen because no legislative policy of
Virginia would be incompatible with giving preclusive effect to the administrative determination. In fact,
Virginia formulated its policy specifically to ensure that the administrative determination has preclusive
effect. Again, however, because Restatement section 61.2(!)(c) deals not with full faith and credit
problems, but only intrastate res judicata questions, the section is of limited utility in the Thomas context.
181. 448 U.S. at 294 (Rehnquist, J. , with Marshall, J., dissenting).

1360

THE GEORGETOWN LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 69:1329

judicial proceedings, as opposed to public acts. The Court's approach to
enforcement of judgments is fraught with uncertainty, and is in direct conflict
with the oft-stated purpose of the full faith and credit clause-the need for
national unification within the federal system.
Second, the Court's attempt to distinguish between court judgments and
administrative determinations finds no justification in the policies that
underlie the full faith and credit clause. The mere fact that a determination is
"administrative" rather than "judicial" should not have significance for full
faith and credit purposes, especially when the distribution of state adjudicatory authority is a matter of state law that the Constitution leaves largely
restricted.
Of course, five members of the Court explicitly rejected the Thomas
plurality's analysis. These five justices disagreed only on the precedential
effect to be accorded the McCartin case, which all the justices conceded rested
on, at best, "questionable foundations." 182 Otherwise, the five justices would
constitute a majority, in an appropriate case, for repudiating the doctrinal
heresy expressed by Justice Stevens in the Thomas case, and more importantly, for elimip.ating the potential practical problems that flow from the
Thomas plurality's evisceration of the full faith and credit clause.
182. Id. at 289 (White, J., with Burger, C.J. & Powell, J. concurring in judgment).

